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INTRODUCTION
From 2010 through 2014, the Supreme Court issued thirteen class
action decisions.1 This unprecedented flurry started with Shady Grove
* Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University. I am grateful to Tom Arthur and Frank
Lowrey IV for comments on an earlier draft and to Lacey Elmore, Emory Law Class of 2016, for
outstanding editorial and research assistance. I am grateful for the invitation to participate in this
Symposium.
1. I say “decisions” as opposed to “cases” to denote opinions in which the Court addressed
some aspect of class practice. In some cases, the Court addressed a substantive issue that just
happened to arise in a class suit. For example, in Northwest Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (U.S.
2014), the Court held that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted state-law claims being asserted
by a putative class. Moreover, although the Court granted certiorari in three cases to resolve an issue
involving the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), the three were consolidated
and resulted in one opinion. Chadbourne & Parke, LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (U.S. 2014).
Finally, though Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (U.S. 2014), was
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Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.2 In 2011, the
Court decided four more.3 It took a breather in 2012 but returned with
five decisions in 2013.4 In 2014, it added three.5 Though the Court
granted certiorari in one case for the 2015 Term, it has since dismissed
the writ as improvidently granted.6 With the flow at least temporarily
abated, it seems an opportune time to take stock of what these decisions
might mean for federal class action practice.
This group of decisions includes some good news for plaintiffs.
Indeed, federal class practice survived two significant threats. First, in
Shady Grove, by holding that Federal Rule 23 was on-point and valid
under the Rules Enabling Act, the Court saved federal diversity class
actions from ready evisceration by state law.7 Second, in Halliburton
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), the Court spared federal
securities class action practice by retaining the fraud-on-the market
presumption of reliance in Rule 10b-5 cases.8 Contrary decisions in
either case would have altered the legal landscape in stunning ways.
And plaintiffs got other good news. In two decisions, the Court
further facilitated securities fraud classes by holding that neither loss
causation nor materiality must be demonstrated at the certification
stage.9 In two others, it held that putative class members of uncertified
classes cannot be bound by the representative’s stipulations about
damages and, more importantly, remain free to re-litigate the question of
class certification.10 In still two more cases, the Court interpreted federal
jurisdictional grants narrowly, thereby allowing plaintiffs to litigate in

brought not as a class action but as a “mass action,” it is included in this study because it raised an
issue under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).
2. Shady Grove Orthopedics Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
3. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131
S. Ct. 2368 (U.S. 2011); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. [hereinafter Halliburton I], 131
S. Ct. 2179 (U.S. 2011); and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (U.S. 2011).
4. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (U.S. 2013); Oxford Health
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (U.S. 2013); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (U.S.
2013); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (U.S. 2013); and Amgen Inc. v.
Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (U.S. 2013).
5. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. [hereinafter Halliburton II], 134 S. Ct. 2398
(U.S. 2014); Chadbourne & Parke, 134 S. Ct. 1058; and Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736.
6. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted
sub nom. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (U.S. 2014), cert.
dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 42 (U.S. 2014).
7. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 144 and 147 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
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their preferred state forum.11
Despite all this, the ledger is fuller on the defendants’ side.12 In four
principal ways, recent case law does not augur well for plaintiffs. First,
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court restricted the recovery of
money in Rule 23(b)(2) classes.13 Second, in the same case, it increased
the showing required for satisfaction of the commonality requirement
under Rule 23(a)(2).14
Third, there is a clear trend toward “front-loading” class litigation –
that is, the need to do more and prove more in the early stages of the
case. The Court has made clear that certification does not raise a
question of pleading, but must be based upon “conclusive proof.” The
fact that the evidence overlaps with the substantive merits of the dispute
is irrelevant. Further, it is likely that expert testimony bearing on
certification must be from witnesses qualified under the Federal Rules of
Evidence and after a full Daubert hearing.15 Moreover, in damages
cases, the representative must prove that damages can be demonstrated
on a class-wide basis.16 Front-loading increases the expense of gaining
certification. Though both sides are affected, the burden may fall harder
on plaintiffs’ counsel, who likely will be working on a contingent fee.
The increased scope of litigation requires greater outlay by counsel to
progress to the adjudication stage.
Fourth, and most consequentially, the Court has countenanced the
wholesale avoidance of dispute resolution by upholding contractual
“waivers” of the right to seek group vindication of rights. Such
provisions are commonly found in conjunction with arbitration clauses.
Successful melding of arbitration clauses with class “waivers” means
that many claims (particularly negative-value claims) will never be
asserted.17
This Article discusses each of the thirteen Supreme Court decisions
with the goal of drawing at least tentative conclusions for their impact on
federal class practice. The thirteen decisions may be placed into five
groups. Only three of the cases directly involve the general interpretation
11. See infra notes 286-95 and accompanying text.
12. Writing after the 2010 and 2011 decisions, Dean Kane concluded that the five cases
decided at that point did not evince any discernible jurisprudential theme. Mary Kay Kane, The
Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing Into a Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1015, 1028 (2012).
13. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
15. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 2

724

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:721

and application of Rule 23, while the other ten fall into four particular
substantive areas. Reflecting these divisions, this Article proceeds in five
parts. Part I discusses the three cases directly interpreting Rule 23. Part
II addresses the three decisions involving securities classes brought
under Rule 10b-5. Part III discusses the three decisions involving the
Federal Arbitration Act. Part IV engages the two decisions addressing
the non-party status of class members. And Part V concerns those
decisions interpreting specialized grants of federal jurisdiction.
I. INTERPRETING RULE 23
This section addresses the three decisions that interpret Rule 23
directly. Of course, these cases affect federal class actions generally,
regardless of the substantive claims asserted.
A.

Shady Grove: Saving Diversity Class Actions

In Shady Grove, an insurance company failed to make timely
payments of benefits.18 Plaintiffs filed a federal class action, which
invoked jurisdiction under the Class Actions Fairness Act (CAFA).19
Class members asserted small statutory claims to recover interest on the
overdue insurance benefits (the representative’s claim, for instance, was
for $500).20 The New York Civil Practice Law forbade assertion of such
claims in a class; they had to be pursued individually.21 Everyone agreed
that the case satisfied the requirements for certification under Rule 23.22
But can the federal courts permit a class action when state law would
not? The Court said yes, but it was close.
Five justices concluded that Rule 23 was on-point and clashed with
state law and, thus, that the matter was governed by Hanna v. Plumer.23
They went on to find the provision valid under the Rules Enabling Act
(REA).24 The four dissenters concluded that Rule 23 did not “answer the
18. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 397 (2010).
19. Id.at 458.
20. Id. at 436.
21. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 901(b) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2015).
22. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397-406.
23. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). On this point, however, there was no majority. Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion applied Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), which requires only that a
Rule “really regulate procedure” to be valid under the Rules Enabling Act. Because Rule 23 deals
with aggregation of claims, it regulated procedure. Justice Stevens prescribed a more searching test
for validity under the REA. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 393 at 416-23. Ultimately, however, he
concluded that Rule 23 passed muster under his test. Thus, five justices upheld the Rule. See
RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 549-54 (3d ed. 2012).
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question in dispute” and therefore rejected Hanna in favor of analysis
under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.25 Shady Grove’s principal legacy,
then, will be in vertical choice-of-law and not in class action practice.
Nonetheless, two aspects of the case are relevant for the present purpose.
First, the majority concluded that the issue of whether Rule 23
“answer[ed] the question in dispute” was easy.26 Over a decade before,
in his majority opinion in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp.,27 Justice Scalia opined that courts should interpret ambiguous
federal directives narrowly to avoid different outcomes in federal and
state court.28 In Shady Grove, he reiterated that position but concluded
that Rule 23 was not ambiguous.29 The provision was susceptible of only
one reading, and applied to the facts of the case.30 Justice Scalia wrote
for himself and three others.31 On this point, however, Justice Stevens
joined, so five justices agreed that Rule 23 governed the matter in
dispute.32
Second, it is important to give Shady Grove its due in preserving
federal class practice. Had the case been decided the other way, two
things would now be true. One, class practice could differ significantly
from federal court to federal court (depending on state law). Two, state
legislatures could prohibit class litigation not only in their courts but in
federal tribunals as well, at least in diversity of citizenship cases. So, as
Professor Mullenix reminds us, Shady Grove saved the federal diversity
class action from “a near-death experience.”33 And it is of at least
passing note that in Shady Grove the “conservative wing” of the Court,

25. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The dissent in Shady Grove was authored by
Justice Ginsburg. Her Erie analysis led her to conclude that state law should govern even in the face
of Rule 23. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 428-36. Justice Stevens, though sensitive to state interests in
vertical choice of law, thought the dissenters contorted Rule 23 beyond recognition. Id. at 429
(“Simply because a rule should be read in light of federalism concerns, it does not follow that courts
may rewrite the rule.”).
26. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 393.
27. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
28. Id. at 498.
29. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406.
30. Id. at 405-06.
31. Id. at 395-96.
32. Reasonable people may disagree, but the conclusion seems correct. Some Federal Rules
either apply to the issue before the court or they do not. Rule 23 in this case and Rule 4 in Hanna
are examples (the latter at least as to methods for serving process). Other Rules are more
problematic. Rule 59, for instance, allows the grant of a new trial but does not give reasons for
doing so. With such a Rule, it is easier to imagine that the federal provision and state law might coexist.
33. Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Class Actions: A New-Death Experience in a Shady Grove,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448 (2010).
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in rebutting this existential threat, supported consumers (by allowing a
class action that would not be permitted in state court) while the “liberal
wing” supported big business’s assertion that it should be free from
aggregate litigation in any court. The “conservative” wing supported
federal preemption of state law,34 while the “liberal” wing championed
application of state law.
B.

Wal-Mart: The Certification Bar

In Wal-Mart, the lower courts approved a nationwide class of
roughly 1,500,000 of the retail giant’s female employees.35 Class
members asserted Title VII sex discrimination claims regarding pay and
lack of promotion.36 Wal-Mart divides its 3,400 stores into 41 regions.37
Store managers make pay and promotion decisions locally with limited
central oversight.38 Plaintiffs argued that this local discretion was
exercised disproportionately in favor of men and created a corporate
culture of discrimination.39 The Ninth Circuit upheld class certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive and monetary relief (in the form of
back pay).40
The Supreme Court reversed on two grounds. Unanimously, the
justices concluded that the monetary relief was improper in a Rule
23(b)(2) class.41 Then, by a five-to-four margin, the Court held that the
class failed to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).42
Along the way, the Court threw in some hints (and maybe some
holdings) on several procedural points.
The limitation of remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) classes seems plainly

34. The scope of that preemption under Hanna is narrower than some plaintiffs have
contended. For example, in Mitchell-Tracey v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 442 F. App’x 2 (4th Cir.
2011), the class representative argued that satisfaction of Rule 23 meant that members did not have
to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the relevant state law. The Fourth Circuit pointed
out that Shady Grove involved an “explicit state-law prohibition” on aggregate litigation; it could
discern no “basis on which to read it as excusing named class action plaintiffs from the threshold
procedural requirements that they would face as individual litigants. To similar effect is DWFII
Corp. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 676 (S.D. Fla. 2010), aff’d per curiam 469
F.App’x 762 (11th Cir. 2011), in which the court held that Rule 23 did not render irrelevant
Florida’s requirement that each claimant send a demand letter to defendant insurance companies.
35. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2546 (U.S. 2011).
36. Id. at 2546.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2548.
40. Id. at 2550.
41. Id. at 2557.
42. Id. at 2555.
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correct. Again, the Court was unanimous on the point, and I am not
alone in thinking that the Ninth Circuit invited reversal by overreaching
in approving the nationwide certification.43 Rule 23(b)(2), according to
the Court, focuses on “indivisible relief.”44 There are important
distinctions between mandatory classes under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2),
on the one hand, and opt-out classes under Rule 23(b)(3), on the other.
The former do not require showings of predominant common questions
or superiority of class litigation because those characteristics are
assumed.45 Classes satisfying Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) are cohesive either
because individual litigation would be impossible or because the relief
sought automatically inures to the benefit of all. In view of this inherent
cohesiveness, due process does not require that class members be
notified of their membership in the class or be given the right to opt out
of the class.46
In contrast, the Rule 23(b)(3) class bundles individual claims that
are bound only by common questions.47 These class members are yoked
not by legal relationships but merely by facts – they happened, for
instance, to be on the same airplane or to use the same defective product.
Because of the lack of relational cohesiveness, due process requires that
classes predominantly asserting individual monetary claims provide the
additional procedural protections of notice and an opportunity to opt

43. See Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1
(impact of Wal-Mart and Concepcion cases could have been avoided had plaintiffs’ counsel not
overreached).
44. This conclusion, all justices agreed, is supported by the terms of the Rule, which require
that relief must be appropriate “respecting the class as a whole” and that the defendant “acted on
grounds that apply generally to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). The conclusion is also supported
by history, because the provision was written to facilitate desegregation, where conduct could be
remedied by a single class-wide order. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557-58.
45. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.
46. In the wake of Wal-Mart, the Federal Circuit addressed an interesting issue in Beer v.
United States. There, an earlier case (Williams) was certified as a Rule 23(b)(2) class on behalf of
Article III judges. It argued that Congress’s failure to give cost-of-living adjustments to judges’
salaries violates the Compensation Clause because it results in a de facto reduction of judicial pay.
The class sought a declaration of compensation due. Class members were not given notice or an
opportunity to opt out. The judges lost on the merits. Beer is a separate class action asserting the
same claim, and the question is whether class members were bound by the judgment in Williams.
The answer is no. The Federal Circuit concluded that Williams, though brought under Rule 23(b)(2)
was about the payment of money; it was essentially a claim for damages. Under Wal-Mart, due
process requires notice in such a case. Because it was not given, the members were not bound. The
court declined to address whether due process also required a right to opt out. Because the class
members in Beer were not bound by Williams, the court was free to decide the merits. The court,
sitting en banc, concluded that Congress had violated the Compensation Clause. Beer v. United
States, 696 F.3d 1174, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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out.48
The back pay claims in Wal-Mart, unlike those in some Rule
23(b)(2) cases, did not flow naturally from the injunctive relief that was
being sought. Indeed, injunctive relief would be meaningless for about
half the class members because they no longer worked for Wal-Mart.49
Moreover, because of different circumstances around the country, back
pay would not be readily calculable; the claims were not liquidated and
there was no ready formula for determining figures for the group.50
Thus, back pay determinations would require myriad individual
determinations, which, the Court concluded, would predominate over
any common questions.51
Here, the Court threw in one of its hints without an express holding:
when individual determinations predominate, there is “the serious
possibility” that due process requires that class members be given notice
and the opportunity to opt out of the class.52 This “serious possibility”
counseled the Court to interpret Rule 23(b)(2) narrowly and to reject
certification.53
Wal-Mart reins in practice under Rule 23(b)(2) to a degree.
Through the years, some lower courts had allowed recovery of monetary
relief in 23(b)(2) classes. They did so on three theories, two of which are
rejected by Wal-Mart. First, some courts justified recovery of money
that could be characterized as “equitable” relief, such as restitution.54
But, as the Court pointed out in Wal-Mart, Rule 23(b)(2) speaks only of
“injunctive” and “declaratory” relief, and not of general “equitable”
remedies.55 Second, some courts held that money could be recovered as
long as the demand for equitable relief “predominates.”56 But, again, as
the Court noted in Wal-Mart, Rule 23(b)(2) does not use that term;
predominance is a factor only in Rule 23(b)(3) classes.57
Only the third theory survives Wal-Mart. This permits recovery of
money in a Rule 23(b)(2) class when the sum will “flow directly from
liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the

48. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559.
49. Id. at 2560.
50. Id. at 2557.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2559.
53. Id. at 2544.
54. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir. 1971).
55. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560.
56. See, e.g., Bratcher v. Nat’l Standard Life Ins. Co. (In re Monumental Life Ins. Co.), 365
F.3d 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2004).
57. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559-60.
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injunctive or declaratory relief.”58 The archetypal example, which the
Court cited in Wal-Mart, is Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.59 There, the
injunction ordered the promotion of class members from one pay grade
to another.60 Back pay flowed automatically from the fact that the class
members were underemployed, which was remedied by the injunction
for all class members in the same way – they were all bumped up a
level.61 In this circumstance, the dollar figure for back pay is essentially
liquidated: it consists of the difference between the pay grades
multiplied by the time each was underemployed.62 After Wal-Mart, this
theory remains viable, and lower courts seem to be hewing the line.63
In Wal-Mart, the Ninth Circuit had tried to get around the need for
individual hearings on back pay by prescribing a trial by formula: a
subset of cases would be tried, and other class members’ back pay would
be extrapolated from those results.64 The Court rejected this plan because
it would deny Wal-Mart its right under Title VII to present defenses to
individual claims.65 This, in turn, would raise the specter of abridging
Wal-Mart’s substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.66
58. Id. at 2560.
59. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
60. Id. at 415.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. An easy case is Cobell v. Salazar, in which the court upheld a monetary recovery by class
members in a Rule 23(b)(2) suit for accounting. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
The case involves claims by individual Native Americans for the Department of the Interior’s
breach of duty to account for funds held in trust. Part of a settlement involved a $1,000 cash
distribution per person. Under the unique facts (including congressional approval of the agreement),
“the information produced from an historical accounting is not likely to be worth significantly more
to some class members than to others, and thus the $1,000 settlement payment is properly viewed as
non-individualized and does not run afoul of Wal-Mart.” Id. at 918.
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012), involved
a class of black securities brokers who alleged that their employer engaged in racial discrimination
in selection of teams and distribution of accounts. The district court denied certification and the
Seventh Circuit, on Rule 23(f) appeal, reversed. Although local managers for the brokerage firm had
considerable discretion in setting up teams of brokers and distributing accounts, the case differed
from Wal-Mart because they acted under two company-wide policies; these policies could account
for disparate impact among employees. Thus, the court instructed the lower court to certify a Rule
23(b)(2) class for determining common issues. Interestingly, however, the court did not permit
recovery of money in the Rule 23(b)(2) class. Rather, if the class were to be successful, pecuniary
relief – back pay and possibly compensatory or punitive damages – could be sought in “hundreds of
separate suits.” Id. at 492.
64. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
65. Id.
66. Usually, the concern under the Rules Enabling Act (REA) is whether application of a
Federal Rule will modify a substantive right under state law. In Wal-Mart, the concern was that trial
by formula, as envisioned by the Ninth Circuit, would rob the defendant of a federal substantive
right – the right under Title VII to present defenses to individual claims.
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One upshot of Wal-Mart may be an increased number of motions to
certify “hybrid” classes, which seek injunctive or declaratory relief
under Rule 23(b)(2) and monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3).67
Though important, the holding on Rule 23(b)(2) pales beside the
five-to-four portion of the case addressing the commonality requirement
of Rule 23(a)(2). Because commonality is a prerequisite for all class
actions, a higher hurdle on this score affects practice under all three
types of classes under Rule 23(b). (Indeed, the holding on commonality
doomed any effort to seek certification as a Rule 23(b)(3) class in WalMart.)
On its face, the holding – that the class claims failed to present any
common question68 – is surprising. Commonality had never been much
of a factor. It was all but impossible to find cases in which courts denied
certification because of a failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2).69 With WalMart, commonality becomes a more serious hurdle to certification. The
majority confirmed that Rule 23(a)(2) requires that only a single
question be common to the class members’ claims.70 According to the

Justice Scalia voiced the general concern of the effect of class actions on substantive rights in Philip
Morris USA Inc. v. Scott. There, he wrote as Circuit Justice of the Fifth Circuit and stayed a
Louisiana intermediate appellate court ruling. The case, a class action brought on behalf of all
smokers in Louisiana, was based upon common law fraud and alleged that the defendant tobacco
companies had “distorted the entire body of public knowledge” about the addictive effect of
nicotine. The state appellate court upheld a judgment on that theory of about $250,000,000, to be
used to fund a 10-year smoking cessation program in Louisiana. 131 S. Ct. 1 (U.S. 2010).
Justice Scalia focused on one asserted error. The state court recognized that an individual plaintiff
attempting to recover damages would be required (as part of the fraud claim) to show reliance on a
knowing misstatement by the defendant. In this class action (seeking payment into a fund that will
benefit the class), however, the plaintiffs need make no such showing. This was because the trial
court had found that the entire class relied upon the defendants’ distortion of “the entire body of
public knowledge.” Moreover, defendants were not permitted to argue that particular plaintiffs did
not rely on the alleged misrepresentations. As a result, individuals who could not recover if they
sued alone will be permitted to recover because the litigation is structured as a class suit.
Justice Scalia concluded: “The extent to which class treatment may constitutionally reduce the
normal requirements of due process is an important question.” Id. at 4. Particularly because
intrastate classes such as this cannot be removed to federal court under CAFA, he was concerned
that “the constraints of the Due Process Clause will be the only federal protection.” Id. The Court
ultimately denied certiorari in the case.
67. See, e.g., Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2012)
(discussing need for hybrid class action after Wal-Mart).
68. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57.
69. To the extent commonality got much of an airing in the case law, it was in Rule 23(b)(3),
which requires that common questions predominate over individual questions. In retrospect,
however, perhaps we should not be surprised at the holding: the Court itself added the Rule 23(a)(2)
issue to the case when it granted certiorari. Obviously, then, at least four justices wanted the issue
on the table.
70. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
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Ninth Circuit, the common question was whether the members were
subject to a single set of policies (as opposed to independent
discriminatory acts) that favored men over women.71 The Supreme Court
shifted the focus of the inquiry. The key is not whether one can posit
common questions, but whether the class litigation will generate
common answers that will drive resolution of the case.72 In other words,
the class members must suffer the same injury and not simply violation
of the same law. Their claims “must depend upon a common
contention,” such as bias on the part of the same supervisor.73 That
common contention “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the
claims in one stroke.”74 In Wal-Mart, the majority concluded that there
was no such “glue”75 – the litigation of no single issue would generate an
answer for the entire class. Any discrimination was the result of
thousands of individual judgment calls, which presented no
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).76
The Ninth Circuit had concluded that there was proof of a policy of
company-wide discrimination, relying on the expert opinion of a
sociologist.77 The lower courts in Wal-Mart concluded that expert
testimony could be considered at certification without proof of
admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and thus without a
showing of reliability under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.78 In another of its hints, the Wal-Mart Court “doubt[ed] that this is
so.”79 It thus suggested, but did not hold, that a full Daubert analysis was
proper at the certification stage.80
At any rate, the Court concluded, the sociologist’s opinions were
worthless. Though the expert opined that Wal-Mart decision-makers
were susceptible to reliance on gender stereotypes, he was unable to say
how frequently such stereotypes actually affected employment
71. Id. at 2549.
72. Id. at 2551.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2544.
76. Id. at 2552.
77. Id. at 2549.
78. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
79. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
80. Typical of the response to Wal-Mart on this issue is: “[i]f a district court has doubts about
whether an expert’s opinions may be critical for a class certification decision, the court should make
an explicit Daubert ruling.” Messner v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir.
2012).
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decisions.81 Thus, the Court concluded, “we can safely disregard what he
has to say.”82 Without proof of a policy of discrimination, there was no
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).
Plaintiffs were no more successful in relying on statistics and
anecdotal evidence to show that individual decisions were made in a
common way. The statistics may have showed differentials between
genders, but did nothing to identify a “specific employment practice”
that caused it.83 And the anecdotal evidence was too skimpy, constituting
only one story per 12,500 class members and touching upon only 235
stores.84 There was no commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) because there
was “no convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and
promotion policy.”85 Plaintiffs thus failed in three ways – by sociological
analysis, statistics, and anecdotal evidence – to show an employment
practice that would tie together 1,500,000 claims.86
Did Wal-Mart bring a sharp break with prior interpretation of Rule
23(a)(2)? Some courts say that it did. For example, in M.D. ex rel.
Stukenberg v. Perry,87 the Fifth Circuit rejected its earlier precedent that
“the test for commonality is not demanding”88 and explained that WalMart “heightened the standards for establishing commonality under Rule
23(a)(2).”89 Thus, the court concluded, although finding that a single
issue would affect a significant number of class members sufficed to
show commonality before Wal-Mart, it is now insufficient. Resolution
of some issue must be central to the validity of each claim.90
81. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
82. Id. at 2554.
83. Id. at 2555-56.
84. Id. at 2556.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2555-57.
87. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 2012). See also Reyes v.
Julia Place Condo. Homeowners’ Ass’n, No. 12-2043, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175111, at *19 n.1
(E.D. La. Dec. 18 2014) (“Although plaintiffs claim that the bar is low for commonality, the case
they cite to has been superseded by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart.”); Baughman
v. Roadrunner Commc’ns, LLC, No. CV-12-565-PHX-SMM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120983, at *8
(D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2014) (“The purpose of the rigorous commonality standard is to require that class
members’ claims depend upon a common contention whose truth or falsity will resolve an issue that
is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”).
88. Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999).
89. Perry, 675 F.3d at 839.
90. Id. at 840. In Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp. (In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 678 F.3d 409, 418 (6th Cir 2012), the court characterized the Wal-Mart
commonality requirement: “The . . . inquiry focuses not on whether common questions can be
raised, but on whether a class action will generate common answers that are likely to drive
resolution of the lawsuit.” But see Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014)
(Wal-Mart did not counsel finding lack of commonality regarding whether a reasonable consumer
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In practice, though, it is not clear how much higher the hurdle may
be. In a later case, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that this new standard
does not mean that differences in the harm suffered by class members
will defeat commonality. The Wal-Mart requirement that class members
“have suffered the same injury”91 is satisfied by showing a common
instance of injurious conduct even though class members’ harm may
vary dramatically.92 Wal-Mart clearly does not require that every
question be common; rather, Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied by “a single
significant question of law or fact.”93 Indeed, to a surprising extent,
some district courts (perhaps particularly in the Ninth Circuit) continue
to rely upon pre-Wal-Mart authority in determining whether
commonality is satisfied.94
Though it is hard to quantify how Wal-Mart commonality might be
more rigorous than earlier practice, the focus on generating common
answers rather than asking common questions is new. It causes courts to
engage the commonality requirement to a degree rarely encountered
before. And, undeniably, this increased engagement results in rejection

would be confused by defendant’s packaging).
91. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157
(1982)).
92. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 810-11 (5th Cir. 2014). See also Serna v. Transp.
Workers Union of Am., No. 3:13-CV-2469-N, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181701, at *9 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 3, 2014) (“There is no requirement under the commonality prong that Plaintiffs establish the
nonexistence of a conflict of interest.”).
93. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
See also Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 688 (9th Cir. 2014) (“While each of the certified ADC
policies and practices may not affect every member of the proposed class and subclass in exactly the
same way, they constitute shared grounds for all inmates in the proposed class and subclass.”);
Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., 731 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (“This does not, however, mean
that every question of law or fact must be common to the class.”); DL v. Dist. of Columbia, 713
F.3d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Again, none of this is to suggest that a class can never be certified
in this kind of case. Rule 23(a)(2) does not require that all questions be common to the class.”).
94. See, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs, Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1175 (JG)(VVP),
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180914, at *187 (E.D. N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014) (“Unlike the related inquiry into
‘predominance’ posed by Rule 23(b)(3), commonality does not present plaintiffs with a particularly
exacting standard.”); Cunningham v. Multnomah Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-01718-ST, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 180960, at *18 (D. Or. Sept. 11, 2014) (“The commonality standard is not strictly
construed . . .”; fact that claims of each class member required individual inquiry into
reasonableness of search did not defeat commonality of challenge to practices of county allegedly
subjecting prisoners to unconstitutional searches); Stemple v. QC Holdings, Inc., No. 12-cv-01997BAS(WVG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125313, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2014) (relying upon preWal-Mart authority that existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates satisfies
Rule 23(a)(2)); In re Conagra Foods, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 537, 568 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citing pre-WalMart authority for the proposition that “The commonality requirement is construed liberally, and the
existence of some common legal and factual issues is sufficient.”).
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of some certification motions for failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2).95
Even if we conclude that Wal-Mart brings negligible change in the
standards for Rule 23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(2), the case makes life more
difficult for plaintiff classes by injecting various procedural hurdles,
sometimes through passing remarks. We have already seen two: the
suggestion (if not holding) that expert witnesses giving evidence
regarding certification be vetted under Daubert96 and the “serious
possibility” that due process require notices and opt-out for class
members seeking individualized monetary recovery.97 There are others,
and they raise the expense of litigating class certification.
For starters, “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading
standard.”98 Instead, plaintiff must “be prepared to prove that . . . in fact”
the requirements are met.99 Quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest
v. Falcon,100 the Court noted that there must be “rigorous analysis,”
“significant proof,” and “actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule
23.”101 Plainly, then, certification is not to be decided on the pleadings;
the parties must present and the court must consider evidence.
In assessing this proof, one nagging question has been what the
Court meant in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin102 when it implied that a
court dealing with class certification should not decide facts that overlap
with the underlying merits. In Falcon, the Court seemed to retrench,
saying that consideration of the merits may be unavoidable when ruling
on certification.103 Wal-Mart now makes this clear, calling the
implication to the contrary in Eisen “purest dictum.”104 In Eisen, the
issue was shifting the cost of notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) class from the
representative to the defendant.105 The district court in that case allocated
the cost based upon its assessment of likelihood that the plaintiff would
prevail on the merits.106 It was in that context (and not class certification)
that the Court decried consideration of the merits. There is no need for
such timidity in ruling on class certification, and Wal-Mart fosters frontloading by envisioning that courts may consider and even rule upon
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See, e.g., DL, 713 F.3d at 126-28.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (U.S. 2011).
Id. at 2551 (emphasis added).
Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982).
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551, 2553, 2551.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
Gen. Tel. Co., 457 U.S. at 155.
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 n.6.
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177.
Id. at 168.
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factual issues that implicate the merits.107
C.

Comcast: Increased Procedural Front-Loading

In Comcast, the Court revisited the topic of evidentiary proof at
certification. This was an antitrust case in which the plaintiffs asserted
that Comcast unlawfully “clustered” cable television providers in the
Philadelphia area, thereby excluding entities that could provide
competitive alternatives for cable service.108 The big questions at
certification were whether antitrust injury and damages could be
demonstrated on a class-wide basis.109 The plaintiffs asserted four
theories of antitrust impact.110 The district court rejected three of these
and permitted the case to proceed only on an “overbuilder” theory of
impact.111 The expert testimony on damages, however, was aimed at
showing damages under all four of the original theories of antitrust
impact.112 It was not limited to the “overbuilder” theory.113
Despite this disconnect between the substantive theory of impact
and the damages model, the Third Circuit held that impact and damages
were susceptible of class-wide proof.114 This holding supported
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) because it ensured that common
questions predominated.115 Moreover, the court refused to allow
Comcast to challenge the damages model at certification because, it
107. Of course, a court should not decide merits-based issues unrelated to certification. “Rule
23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.
Merits questions may be considered to the extent – but only to the extent – that they are relevant to
determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Amgen Inc. v.
Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95 (U.S. 2013).
108. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1428 (U.S. 2013).
109. Plaintiffs need not prove the antitrust injury or damages themselves at certification.
Rather, they must demonstrate that at trial they will be able to prove “to the satisfaction of a jury
that ‘all putative class members suffered an injury and that the injury resulted from anti-competitive
harms to the market as a whole.’” In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D.
Ill. 2011).
110. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430.
111. Id. at 1431.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit heard the
matter under Rule 23(f) on January 11, 2011, but did not issue its decision until August 23, 2011.
Undoubtedly, it waited for the decision in Wal-Mart, which issued on June 23, 2011. The Third
Circuit majority opinion cited Wal-Mart in four footnotes, but based its holding largely on In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). Indeed, the majority says that in
Wal-Mart, the “Supreme Court confirmed our interpretation of the Rule 23 inquiry [from Hydrogen
Peroxide].” Behrend, 655 F.3d at 190 n.6.
115. Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions predominate and that class litigation be
superior to other means of resolving the dispute.
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concluded, such arguments would improperly enmesh the court in
consideration of the underlying merits.116 Finally, the expert evidence on
damages was not vetted under Daubert.
The Court granted certiorari on the question of “whether a district
court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff
class had introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to
show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide
basis.”117 Comcast waived the Daubert issue by failing to object to the
admission of plaintiffs’ expert testimony.118 Though this failure made it
impossible for Comcast to argue that the testimony was not “admissible
evidence,” Comcast remained free to argue that the evidence (when
admitted) failed to show that damages could be shown on a class-wide
basis.119
The Court reversed certification.120 The five-member majority
emphasized that its ruling was based upon Rule 23 and not on
substantive antitrust law.121 It made three significant pronouncements.
First, the need for “evidentiary proof” (as opposed to allegations)
required in Wal-Mart applies to Rule 23(b) as well as to Rule 23(a).122
Indeed, “[i]f anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even
more demanding than Rule 23(a).”123 Second, because of the need for
litigation of whether common questions predominated, the lower courts
erred by not permitting Comcast to present evidence against the
plaintiffs’ proffered damages model.124 And third, that model was fatally
flawed because it was not limited to the “overbuilder” theory of antitrust
impact.125
None of these three conclusions is surprising after Wal-Mart. It
would be unthinkable that one need proof to satisfy Rule 23(a) but not
Rule 23(b). And once we decide to litigate questions overlapping with
the merits, it would be unthinkable not to let the defendant litigate the
issue. The holding on the third point also echoes Wal-Mart: even if we
considered the plaintiffs’ expert evidence without a Daubert hearing, it
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
provides
1433.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1431.
Id. at 1435.
Id. at 1436.
Id. at 1431-32 n.4.
Id. at 1435.
“This case thus turns on the straightforward application of class-certification principles; it
no occasion for the dissent’s extended discussion . . . of substantive antitrust law.” Id. at
Id. at 1432.
Id.
Id. at 1432-33.
Id. at 1433.
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was worthless. In Wal-Mart, the expert could not say that the Wal-Mart
“culture” he perceived had affected a single employment decision.126 In
Comcast, the class-wide proof on damages did not match the theory of
antitrust impact and, therefore, of liability.127
With Wal-Mart and Comcast, the Court has done more than limit
the availability of monetary relief in Rule 23(b)(2) classes and up the
ante for showing commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). It has interpreted
Rule 23 to increase the scope of litigation at class certification.
Certification is not decided on pleadings but requires presentation of
evidence concerning satisfaction of Rule 23(a) and 23(b). The factual
issues decided may overlap with the merits of the case. Expert testimony
probably must satisfy Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
means that there must be litigation concerning whether the expert is
qualified under Daubert. The plaintiffs must hew their substantive
theory of liability with their expert evidence that damages may be
proved en masse. And defendants must be permitted to challenge
whether the class has satisfied any of these steps.
This front-loading increases the expense of litigating class
certification. More is on the table at an early stage than in prior practice.
I call this “procedural front-loading” because it is imposed by Rule 23.
We turn next to efforts by defendants to front-load certification litigation
further by insisting that certain substantive matters be litigated at the
certification stage. The examples come from securities fraud cases.
II. REJECTION OF SUBSTANTIVE FRONT-LOADING IN SECURITIES
LITIGATION
Three times since 2011 the Court has dealt with “substantive frontloading” in the context of securities class actions under Rule 10b-5. By
this I mean litigation at the certification stage that is not imposed by
Rule 23 but by the substantive law of the claim asserted. Two of the
opinions involve the same case: Halliburton I,128 decided in 2011, and
Halliburton II,129 decided in 2014. Between them, in 2013, the Court
decided Amgen.130 In each, the fact pattern is familiar: a publicly traded
company (or its agent) makes a misrepresentation that inflates the price
of its stock; plaintiffs buy the stock at the inflated price; a corrective

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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announcement is made, and the price of the stock falls. Everyone agrees
that a class of buyers or sellers of the stock will satisfy Rule 23(a). The
question is whether common questions can predominate for certification
of a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3).
To prevail on the merits in a private Rule 10b-5 case, plaintiffs
must demonstrate various elements, which include material
misrepresentation,131 scienter, and a connection between the
misrepresentation and the purchase or sale of a security. We focus here
on three other elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim: (1) reliance (the plaintiff
must have relied on the misrepresentation); (2) materiality (the
misrepresentation must have been about something a reasonable investor
would have considered important); and (3) “loss causation.” The third,
imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, requires
plaintiffs to show that their loss resulted from the misrepresentation and
its correction, and not from some other (e.g., macro-economic) cause.132
If each class member were required to demonstrate these three
things individually, class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) would be
impossible, because individual issues would predominate over common
ones. The Court recognized this in 1988 in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.133
There it endorsed the “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which creates a
rebuttable presumption of reliance.134 The presumption arises when the
stock is traded on an efficient market and the material misstatement was
made publicly.135 The idea is that efficient markets factor into the stock
price the entire mix of public information – good and bad.136 As the
Court later explained, the presumption attaches if (1) the misstatement
was made publicly, (2) was material, (3) the securities market on which
the security is traded is efficient, and (4) the plaintiff bought or sold
during the relevant time frame.137
Without Basic, few (if any) Rule 10b-5 damages classes could be
certified.138 The representative bears the burden at the certification stage
131. An omission of fact may also be actionable under Rule 10b-5, but for convenience we
will assume a case based upon misrepresentation.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012) (plaintiff “shall have the burden of proving that the act or
omission of the defendant . . . caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”).
133. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
134. Id. at 250.
135. Id. at 237.
136. Id.
137. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2412 (U.S. 2014).
138. “Absent the fraud-on-the-market theory, the requirement that Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs
establish reliance would ordinarily preclude certification of a class action seeking money damages
because individual reliance issues would overwhelm questions common to the class.” Amgen Inc. v.
Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (U.S. 2013).
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of demonstrating that the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance
should attach.139 If she satisfies this burden, reliance is presumed for the
entire class and presents no individual questions.140 The defendant is free
to rebut the presumption, but this is a tough row to hoe. For example, the
defendant might show that individual class members in fact did not rely
on the misstatement. Such proof would be rare, and would probably only
pick off a few class members at most.
Through the years, the Fifth Circuit required that the representative
show loss causation as a prerequisite to certification.141 In Halliburton I,
because the representative did not do so, the Fifth Circuit rejected
certification.142 The Supreme Court reversed unanimously and
explained: “Loss causation has no logical connection to the facts
necessary to establish the efficient market predicate to the fraud-on-themarket theory.”143 Loss causation simply has nothing to do with reliance.
Thus, it is a “merits” issue to be proved at the adjudication (not the
certification) stage.144
In Amgen, the Court faced a tougher call: whether the
representative, to invoke the presumption of reliance, must demonstrate
materiality of the misstatement.145 Courts of appeals had disagreed on
the question and inextricable sub-question of whether the defendant
should be permitted to demonstrate – again, at the certification stage –
that the misstatement was not material.146 Materiality presents a difficult
139. Basic, 485 U.S. at 225.
140. Id. at 225.
141. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2181 (U.S. 2011).
142. Id. at 2181.
143. Id. at 2186.
144. It may be difficult to translate the holding in Amgen to other substantive areas. For
example, in Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013), a class of authors sued
Google for copyright infringement for providing “snippets” of millions of copyrighted works. The
defendant asserted “fair use” under the copyright law. The district judge certified the plaintiff class.
The Second Circuit rejected the effort, however, and ruled that the holding was premature:
On the particular facts of this case, we conclude that class certification was premature in
the absence of a determination by the District Court of the merits of Google’s “fair use”
defense. Accordingly, we vacate the June 11, 2012 order certifying the class and remand
the cause to the District Court, for consideration of the fair use issues, without prejudice
to any future motion for class certification.
Id. at 132.
145. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1189 (U.S. 2013).
146. Compare, e.g., Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst
Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2008) (representative must show materiality at
certification stage and defendant may introduce evidence to rebut the showing) and Oscar Private
Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007) (same), abrogated on
other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (U.S. 2011), with the Ninth Circuit decision affirmed in Amgen, 133
S. Ct. 1184.
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issue because it, unlike loss causation, is relevant both for adjudication
on the merits (it is an element of a Rule 10b-5 claim) and to invoke the
fraud-on-the-market presumption for reliance (after all, no one would
rely on an immaterial misstatement about the value of securities).
In Amgen, the Court held that the representative is not required to
present evidence of materiality at the certification stage.147 Materiality,
the Court explained, will always be susceptible to aggregate proof (and
is either met or not met for all class members).148 Accordingly,
materiality can be decided en masse at the adjudication stage (trial or
summary judgment).149 If the class fails to demonstrate materiality,
every class member’s claim will be rejected on the merits.150 Because
proof of materiality is irrelevant in ruling on certification, the Court
reasoned, the defendant may not attempt to rebut materiality at that
stage.151
After remand in Halliburton I, the defendant argued that it should
be permitted to oppose certification by attacking the applicability of the
fraud-on-the-market theory and thus the presumption of reliance.152
Specifically, it asserted that the misstatement had no “price impact” on
the facts of the case.153 The Fifth Circuit, relying on Amgen, held that the
defendant could not proffer the evidence and that the case should
proceed to adjudication with the presumption of reliance intact.154
In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on that
question and added the issue of whether Basic ought to be overruled.155
Justice Scalia had raised that bombshell question during oral argument in
Amgen.156 Halliburton argued that economic science had demonstrated
that the Basic presumption was flawed.157 The Court rejected the
argument and held that Halliburton had not met the heavy burden of
overcoming stare decisis.158
147. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1188.
148. Id. at 1189.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1203-04.
151. In Amgen, the defendant sought to prove at certification that what it admitted was a
public misstatement was not material because the market clearly understood it to be untrue, in part
because of other public statements and documents. Id.
152. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (U.S. 2011).
153. Id. at 2187.
154. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013).
155. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (U.S. 2014).
156. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds,
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (No. 11-1085).
157. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1198.
158. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2411.
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As with Shady Grove, it is worth pondering how a contrary
conclusion would have changed the landscape. Just as the former saved
Rule 23 from evisceration by state law, Halliburton II rejected nothing
less than an existential threat to private securities class actions.
Beyond this, Halliburton II clarified the discussion in Amgen of
what issues may be litigated at the certification stage. As noted above,
there are four requirements for invoking the fraud-on-the-market
presumption: (1) the misstatement/omission was made publicly, (2) it
was material, (3) the securities market is efficient, and (4) the plaintiff
bought or sold the securities during the relevant time frame.159 The Court
explained that three of the four requirements – publicity, materiality, and
efficiency of the market –concern “price impact”; that is, whether the
misrepresentation affected the market price of the security.160 While
Amgen held that materiality is an issue to be litigated at the adjudication
stage, the representative must demonstrate at certification that the other
three are satisfied.161 Without that showing, the plaintiffs cannot invoke
the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.162
Because these issues are on the table for certification, the defendant
must be permitted to demonstrate lack of “price impact” at that time.163
Specifically, this means that Halliburton will be permitted present
evidence that the misrepresentation did not affect the market price.164
These securities cases represent significant victories for the plaintiffs’
bar. First, the Court rejected efforts to overrule Basic. Second, it rejected
efforts to front-load litigation based upon substantive elements of Rule
10b-5 claims. Of course, the Court permits the defendant to attack the
application of the presumption of reliance, which will add to litigation at
the certification stage (though probably in very few cases).165 Third, the
Court made clear in Amgen that the representative’s burden is to
159. Id. at 2413.
160. Id. at 2414.
161. Id. at 2416.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2414.
164. The argument is that the public market discounted the misrepresentation/omission in light
of other statements. This would appear to come very close to Halliburton’s earlier argument that the
misstatement/omission was not material. After Amgen and Halliburton II, Halliburton cannot
introduce evidence of immateriality at the certification motion, but it can argue lack of “price
impact.”
165. In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that the holding “may broaden the
scope of discovery available at certification.” Because the evidence will be produced by the
defendant, however, she concluded that the expansion of front-loading in Halliburton II should
“impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims.” Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct.
at 2417.
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demonstrate that the Rule 23 prerequisites have been met, and not that
every question will be answered on the merits in favor of the class.166
Cases in the first two Parts of this Article have dealt with
defendants’ assertion that certification litigation should embrace more
issues. We turn next to a more audacious assertion: that class
certification may be avoided altogether.
III. AVOIDANCE: THE ARBITRATION/CLASS “WAIVER” TRUMP CARD
The Supreme Court’s fulsome embrace of arbitration clauses is well
chronicled.167 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), passed in 1925,
decreed an end to judicial hostility to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.168 At the time, arbitration clauses applied to contractual
claims between business entities. In the past generation, arbitration
clauses have found their way into innumerable contracts of adhesion and
have expanded from contract claims to cover a wide variety of
consumer, employment, tort, and federal statutory claims. The Court has
been willing to uphold clauses in these new contexts, emphasizing the
freedom of parties to contract on such matters.169 More recently, many
adhesion contracts have added another provision: a “waiver” of
aggregate litigation170 – that is, a clause that forbids plaintiffs from
joining to assert their claims in arbitration.
This combination sets up a collision course between the procontract policy of the FAA, on the one hand, and basic access to justice,
on the other. The clash is illustrated by AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion.171 There, customers signed up for a cellphone plan with
AT&T that offered a free phone.172 The problem was that AT&T then
charged customers for sales tax on the phone ($30.22 per phone).173 The
166. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (U.S. 2011) (emphasis in original) (“Rule
23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those
questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.”).
167. See, e.g., 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3569 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing case law and citing literature).
168. Courts traditionally rejected arbitration clauses (and forum selection clauses, for that
matter) on the theory that they constituted improper private efforts to “oust” courts of jurisdiction.
See generally id. § 2569.
169. State-law contract defenses may be invoked to avoid arbitration. The most important is
unconscionability.
170. Because the prohibition of aggregate assertion of claims is typically contained in a
contract of adhesion, “waiver” – at least insofar as it implies voluntary relinquishment – is a
euphemistic term.
171. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (U.S. 2011).
172. Id. at 1742.
173. Id. at 1744.
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agreement provided for arbitration of disputes and forbade class
arbitration.174 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs brought a federal class action
based upon state consumer law.175 The provider moved to compel
arbitration, which the district court denied.176 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.177 It relied upon Discover Bank v. Superior Court, in which the
California Supreme Court held that waivers of the right to collective
arbitration are unconscionable if included in adhesion contracts
involving negative-value consumer fraud claims.178 The effect of the
California holding was to permit the customers to demand class
arbitration even though their contract with the retailer forbade it.179
The Court reversed.180 The five-justice majority, led by Justice
Scalia, held that the FAA preempts the state case law.181 The Court
noted that Section 2 of the FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration
clauses, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”182 This “savings clause” permits
invalidation of arbitration agreements on state-law grounds applicable to
contracts generally (such as fraud or unconscionability),183 but not on
grounds that apply only to arbitration clauses.184 There are two situations
in which the FAA preempts state law: (1) when the state law prohibits
outright the arbitration of a type of claim and (2) when a general contract
defense is applied in a way that disfavors arbitration.185 Thus, state-law
rules that “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1744-45.
177. Id. at 1745.
178. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at
1745.
179. Interestingly, as noted, the representatives sought to bring class litigation, not arbitration.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (“In March of 2006, the Concepcions filed a complaint against
AT&T in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.”).
180. Id. at 1753.
181. Id. at 1740.
182. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
183. See, e.g., Barras v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Checking Account Overdraft
Litig. MDL No. 2036), 685 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (provision that expenses of arbitration be
borne by customer regardless of outcome is unconscionable as a matter of general contract law;
clause was severable from arbitration provision, however, so arbitration would be ordered); Palmer
v. Infosys Techs., Ltd. Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (arbitration agreement
unconscionable as a matter of general contract law; “[w]hile the Concepcion Court expressed
concern about arbitration morphing into a set of formalized, class-based procedures, this arbitration
agreement is unconscionable at an antecedent step.”).
184. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
185. Id. at 1747.
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objectives”186 are preempted.
According to the Court, the California law in Discover Bank was
such a rule.187 One purpose of the FAA is to ensure enforcement of
arbitration clauses according to their terms.188 Another is to foster
efficient, speedy dispute resolution.189 The Court concluded that
California law obstructed the latter objective by (1) replacing bilateral
arbitration with a slower, expensive, procedurally complicated method
“more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”;190 (2)
placing the arbitrator in the unaccustomed position of having to protect
absentees’ interests; and (3) exposing the defendant to enormous
potential liability based upon the outcome of a single case; this risk is
exacerbated by the limited appellate review available in arbitration
cases.191 Concepcion had an immediate impact. Several courts held that
the FAA preempted state consumer protection laws mandating class
resolution.192 In Kilgore v. Keybank, National Assn.,193 a non-class case,
the Ninth Circuit got the message (after being reversed in
Concepcion).194 It held that the FAA preempts California law that
forbids arbitration altogether (class or individual) in cases seeking public
injunctive relief.195 The theory of the California precedent is that such
private attorney general cases should be litigated in court and not
arbitrated.196 Because the state case law was a blanket ban on arbitration,
it interfered with the policy goals of the FAA and, under Concepcion,
was preempted.197
There are arguments against class treatment (in litigation or
arbitration) in cases like Concepcion. One of the historic justifications of
the class action is efficiency – it will substitute one case (albeit complex)
for thousands of small ones. But negative-value claims such as those in

186. Id. at 1748.
187. Id. at 1756.
188. Id. at 1748.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1751.
191. Id. at 1751-52.
192. See, e.g., Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (court did
not have to reach issue of whether Florida law invalidated class action waiver; to the extent it
would, it is preempted by FAA); Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir, 2012)
(Washington law); Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (Florida law).
193. Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., 673 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2012).
194. Id. at 959, reh’g en banc, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013).
195. Id. at 960.
196. Id. at 958.
197. Id. at 959
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Concepcion will not be asserted individually.198 As Judge Posner has
said, only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.199 Because the thousands of
small claims would never be filed, aggregation actually creates litigation
that would never have been filed. Creating litigation usually is thought to
be a bad thing. Moreover, promoting proceedings in these cases seems
inconsistent with the maxim de minimis non curat lex. That precept
teaches us that in this world, we occasionally have to take our lumps for
$30. And, of course, aggregation of claims exposes a defendant to
potentially catastrophic liability on the basis of one roll of the dice.
But there are profound policies in the other direction. Litigation and
arbitration are methods of law enforcement. If no one will file a claim,
the law will not be enforced. Stated another way, enforcing a class action
“waiver” can be exculpatory: it gives the defendant a pass, at least as to
negative-value claims that de facto will not be enforced individually. So
viewed, Concepcion thwarts the power of the states to decide how to
enforce their consumer protection (and other) laws. It forbids a state
from permitting private vindication of its laws in lieu of (or in addition
to) administrative or criminal enforcement.
Of course, state policy must bow to valid applicable federal law.
According to Concepcion, a state “cannot require a procedure that is
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated
reasons.”200 This is an important phrase. It suggests that “waivers” of
class arbitration will be upheld (when preempted by the FAA) even if it
is clear that no one in the putative class will bring an individual claim.
This implication is consistent with the Court’s relentless theme that
agreements are to be enforced by their terms.201 On the facts, the
majority in Concepcion concluded that claims would be vindicated in
individual arbitration.202 The agreement in the case was seen as
198. Notice the similarity between the class action arbitration waiver in Concepcion and the
New York statute in Shady Grove. Both the contract in Concepcion and the statute in Shady Grove
rule out aggregation in precisely the circumstance – the small claim case – when we fear that
individual claims will not be pursued.
199. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
200. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (U.S. 2011).
201. See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669-673 (U.S. 2012)
(because Credit Repair Organizations Act was silent regarding arbitration, agreement to arbitrate
claims is enforceable); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (U.S. 2010)
(when contract was silent regarding permissibility of class arbitration, arbitrator may not infer
consent to aggregation). The Court has been very active in arbitration in recent years, and has
consistently emphasized the importance of enforcing the agreement as written. See WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 167, § 3569. See also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (FAA requires enforcement of arbitration
provisions “in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”).
202. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
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consumer-friendly.203 The clause required arbitration in the customer’s
home county, required AT&T to pay all costs, and, if the arbitration
award was higher than the defendant’s offer, the customer would recover
$7,500 and double attorney’s fees.204 Thus, the Court did not see the
provision as preventing vindication of the consumers’ claims.
Consumer advocates question whether the terms of the AT&T
agreement in Concepcion really promoted individual vindication of
claims.205 In Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,206 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the same contract involved in Concepcion. In Cruz, though,
unlike in Concepcion, plaintiffs’ lawyers submitted affidavits from
attorneys averring that they would not represent consumers on an
individual basis in such cases.207 They also presented evidence that only
an infinitesimal percentage of consumers actually pursued claims under
the arbitration provision – notwithstanding the pro-consumer
provisions.208 The Eleventh Circuit concluded, however, that it “need not
reach the question of whether Concepcion leaves open the possibility
that in some cases, an arbitration agreement may be invalidated on
public policy grounds where it effectively prevents the claimant from
vindicating her statutory cause of action.”209 The argument, the court
said, was foreclosed by Concepcion itself, which had upheld the very
same class action waiver provision.210
Lower courts appeared to read Concepcion broadly – to hold that
the FAA’s preemptive power is not readily tempered by the need to
facilitate civil enforcement of the law.211 In the face of this trend,
203. The district court concluded that the class members would be better off pursuing that
remedy than aggregate resolution.
204. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
205. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What
Does the Future Hold After Concepcion? 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 345 (2013), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1205&context=jbtl.
206. Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011).
207. Id. at 1214.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1215.
210. Id. The contract in Concepcion and Cruz contained a “blow up” provision under which
invalidity of any part of the arbitration provision would result in voiding arbitration altogether. The
Eleventh Circuit discussed this non-severability clause in Cruz. If state law invalidated the waiver of
class arbitration, the court noted, the entire arbitration agreement would be thwarted, and the case
could proceed only in the courts. Id. This result would thoroughly frustrate the policy of the FAA
and constituted another reason to hold the state law preempted. For some reason, neither the Ninth
Circuit nor the Supreme Court in Concepcion discussed the blow up provision. The Ninth Circuit
later adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Cruz. See Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155
(9th Cir. 2012).
211. See, eg., Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2011); Cruz, 648 F.3d 1205;
Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013).
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however, the Second Circuit went the other way in American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.212 There, a class of restaurant owners
sued American Express, alleging that the credit card company violated
federal antitrust laws by using monopoly power to force them to accept
credit cards at higher interest rates than those charged by competitors.213
The agreements required arbitration and forbade aggregation.214 Though
the claims were not de minimus, plaintiffs argued that they were
negative-value claims.215 Specifically, the cost of retaining expert
witnesses on the complex economic issues in such cases would be
prohibitive.216 Only if they could litigate en masse would it be feasible to
retain experts and prove the case.217 The Second Circuit struck the class
action “waiver” on policy grounds.218 It distinguished Concepcion
because the plaintiffs had shown that pursuit of individual claims was
not feasible.219 The court concluded that the “federal substantive law of
arbitrability” permits a court to compel class arbitration when it finds
that aggregate resolution is the “only economically feasible means” for
the plaintiff to pursue its federal-law claim.220 Stated another way,
“effective vindication” of the antitrust laws required invalidation of the
class waiver.221
The Court reversed, five to three,222 with Justice Scalia again
writing for the majority. Here, the Court could not say, as it could in
Concepcion, that provisions in the arbitration clause facilitated
individual vindication of claims.223 The Court was willing to accept that

212. Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. (In re Am. Express
Merchs. Litig.), 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (U.S. 2013). The Supreme Court had earlier remanded the case to the Second
Circuit for reconsideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen. While the case was pending at the Second
Circuit on remand, the Court decided Concepcion.
213. Italian Colors, 667 F.3d at 207.
214. Id. at 206.
215. Id. at 210.
216. The class asserted that American Express used its monopoly power in the credit card
market to force merchants to pay more than they would for competing cards. They argued that the
agreement constituted an illegal tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2308.
217. Italian Colors, 667 F.3d at 212.
218. Id. at 219.
219. Id. at 214.
220. Id. at 213-14. The fact that Italian Colors involved federal claims while Concepcion
involved state-law claims appeared to be of no significance to the Second Circuit or to the Supreme
Court.
221. Id. at 217.
222. Justice Sotomayor recused.
223. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (U.S. 2013).
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individual litigation would be infeasible economically.224 Still,
Concepcion governed.225 The majority explained that nothing in the
FAA, the antitrust laws, or Rule 23 evinces an intention to prohibit
parties from foregoing their right to assert class claims.226
More importantly, the Court discussed the “effective vindication”
argument embraced by the Second Circuit.227 It recognized that “public
policy” can invalidate agreements that operate “as a prospective waiver
of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.”228 But nothing in the
present agreement impeded the plaintiffs’ ability to pursue statutory
remedies.229 The substantive damages claim asserted under the Sherman
Act was created 48 years before promulgation of the original Rule 23
made it possible to aggregate such claims.230 The fact that it is not worth
the expense of proving the claim “does not constitute the elimination of
the right to pursue that remedy.”231 In short, “the antitrust laws do not
guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every
claim.”232 Bluntly, then, the majority concluded that a prohibitively
expensive path to vindicate one’s rights is not equivalent to the
elimination of those rights.233
The Court’s FAA cases elevate contract over various substantive
policies: the plaintiffs agreed (1) to arbitrate instead of litigate and (2) to
go it alone. Unless Congress provides that aggregate litigation is
necessary for vindication of particular claims, the parties will be bound
by their contract.234 And because of the supremacy of federal law, state
law will not be permitted to require group vindication.235
Of course, parties are free to contract to arbitrate en masse.
Presumably, such agreements are rare, and many contracts will not
address the issue expressly. In those cases, Oxford Health gives some
solace to plaintiffs.236 There, the arbitrator interpreted the arbitration
224. Id. at 2313.
225. Id. at 2309.
226. Indeed, the Court said, if Rule 23 were interpreted to invalidate private arbitration
agreements and waivers, it would likely violate the Rules Enabling Act. Id. at 2309-10.
227. Id. at 2310-11.
228. Id. at 2310 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 n.19 (1985)).
229. Id. at 2311.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2306.
233. Id. at 2311.
234. Id. at 2309.
235. Id. at 2320.
236. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (U.S. 2013).
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clause to manifest an agreement to class treatment.237 Applying the
FAA’s limited provision for judicial review of arbitration decisions, the
Court upheld the order.238 Oxford Health is consistent with the procontract policy of the Court’s other decisions.239
Though Oxford Health opens the door for class proceedings, it is
not much of an opening. After all, corporations can simply insert class
“waivers” into their arbitration provisions. The current state of affairs
under Concepcion and Italian Colors is not encouraging for private
enforcement of law through the class mechanism. This problem,
however, is not the result of class action jurisprudence. It is a result of
the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, which uncritically has applied that Act
to contracts and claims not envisioned when it was passed. There is,
however, no indication that the Court is willing to retreat from its
position. Efforts for legislative change have failed. Though the trend
threatens aggregate assertion of claims, obviously, not all claims will be
subject to contractual limitation. When class litigation proceeds, it is
important to determine when the representative’s acts can bind class
members. We address aspects of that question next.
IV. STATUS OF CLASS MEMBERS IN AN UNCERTIFIED CLASS
Smith v. Bayer Corp.,240 decided in 2011, and Standard Fire Ins.
Co. v. Knowles,241 decided in 2013, concern the fundamental principle
that one who has not been accorded a “day in court” cannot be bound by
a judgment. Smith involved overlapping classes: Case 1 was in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction,242 and Case 2 was in state court.243 In
each, essentially the same class (with different representatives) sued
Bayer under West Virginia law for an allegedly defective product.244 The
federal court denied certification under Rule 23(b)(3) because common

237. The parties agreed to submit any “civil action” to arbitration. Because class actions are
civil actions, the arbitrator concluded, the parties intended to permit class proceedings. Id. at 2067.
238. The arbitrator did not “exceed [his] powers” under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), so a court is
powerless to vacate the order. As the Court explained in Oxford Health, the question under that
provision is “whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties’ contract, not whether he
got its meaning right or wrong.” Id. at 2071.
239. The case is to be distinguished from Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559
U.S. 662, 684 (2010). There, the arbitrator exceeded his powers by ordering class arbitration in light
of the parties’ stipulation that they did not agree on the issue of class proceedings.
240. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2373 (U.S. 2011).
241. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (U.S. 2013).
242. Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2373.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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questions would not predominate under applicable state law.245 The
federal court then issued an anti-suit injunction against prosecution of
the state class action.246 It invoked the “re-litigation exception” to the
Anti-Injunction Statute, which permits an injunction against state
proceedings if necessary to protect or effectuate the federal court’s
judgments.247 The Eighth Circuit248 held that the finding on whether
common questions predominated under Rule 23(b)(3) was entitled to
issue preclusion and thus that the injunction was justified.249
The Court reversed unanimously.250 First, Case 1 and Case 2 did
not present the same issue.251 Though West Virginia has adopted Rule
23, it interprets the provision differently from federal courts.252 Thus a
finding of predominance of common questions under one did not
address the same issue as that raised under the other.253 Second, the
representative in Case 2 could not be bound by the judgment in Case
1.254 True, he was a class member in Case 1, but he was not the
representative, and thus, he was not a party.255 And because class
certification was denied, he could not be bound by the result in Case 1—
he had not had his day in court.256
Knowles does something similar. Here, the representative filed a
class action in state court asserting a state-law claim for alleged breach
of homeowners’ insurance policies.257 In the complaint and in an
attached affidavit, he expressly limited the amount the class would seek
to under $5,000,000.258 The obvious intent was to defeat removal under
245. Id. at 2380.
246. Id. at 2374.
247. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012); Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2374.
248. The case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court in West Virginia,
which is in the Fourth Circuit. It was transferred to the District of Minnesota under the MDL statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). That is why the appeal went to the Eighth Circuit.
249. Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2374.
250. Id. at 2372.
251. Id. at 2378.
252. Id. at 2377.
253. The case is reminiscent of Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988), in
which differences between the federal and state standards for forum non conveniens rendered issue
preclusion inapplicable.
254. Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2376.
255. Id. at 2380.
256. Id.
257. He claimed that the insurance company, in making loss payments to homeowners for hail
damage, had unlawfully failed to include a general contractor’s fee. The complaint alleged that there
were “hundreds, and possibly thousands” of similarly situated policyholders in Arkansas. Standard
Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1347 (U.S. 2013).
258. The writ of certiorari and briefs in the case spoke of the representative’s “stipulation” to
limit the amount sought by the class. The complaint alleged that the representative and class

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/2

30

Freer: Class Action Jurisprudence

2015]

CLASS ACTION JURISPRUDENCE

751

CAFA, which requires aggregated class claims in excess of
$5,000,000.259
The defendant removed to federal court under CAFA and showed
by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims in fact totaled slightly
more than $5,000,000.260 The burden then shifted to the representative to
show to a legal certainty that the claims did not exceed $5,000,000.261
The district court ordered remand, holding that the statement in the
complaint – eschewing damages of more than $5,000,000 – was
effective.262 The Eighth Circuit declined interlocutory review, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.263
The Court vacated the district court’s ruling and held that the case
invoked subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA.264 It recognized that a
plaintiff can defeat removal by stipulating that she will not accept an
amount that would satisfy the jurisdictional amount in controversy
requirement.265 But such a stipulation must be binding on the plaintiff.266
In Knowles, the class representative had no authority to bind the class
members to the stipulation because the court had not certified a class.267
Accordingly, the representative was not in a position to bind the
absentee putative class members.268 The Court explained:
[A] plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind
members of the proposed class before the class is certified. . . . Because his precertification stipulation does not bind anyone but himself,
“stipulate they will seek to recover total aggregate damages of less than five million dollars.” In an
attached affidavit, the representative said that he “will not at any time . . . seek damages for the
class . . . in excess of $5,000,000 in the aggregate.” Id.
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012). To keep the class claims below $5,000,000, the
representative sought only two years’ worth of damages on behalf of the class members (of a total
of five years that would be permitted under the statute of limitations). Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at
1347.
260. Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at 1348.
261. Id.
262. The court relied upon Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2009), which, while
not addressing the “legal certainty” standard imposed in Knowles, held that a good faith stipulation
limiting plaintiff’s recovery can defeat federal jurisdiction.
263. Courts had disagreed on whether a representative’s limitation of damages could defeat
removal under CAFA. Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at 1348. Of the thirteen class action cases reviewed
in this Article, only Knowles and Mississippi ex rel. Hood, discussed in Part V below, involved
CAFA.
264. Id. at 1350.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. The situation is different with individual litigation. A plaintiff suing for himself may, for
example, limit his recovery to $75,000 or less and thus avoid removal on the basis of diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction. Id.
268. Id. at 1349.
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Knowles has not reduced the value of the putative class members’
claims. . . . The Federal District Court, therefore, wrongly concluded
that Knowles’ precertification stipulation could overcome its finding
269
that the CAFA jurisdictional threshold had been met.

Knowles may be seen to promote plaintiff class practice by
forbidding a representative from bargaining away class members’ rights
to sue for the maximum recovery possible. On the other hand, Knowles
permits defendants to remove cases to federal court under CAFA
(assuming minimal diversity) by showing that the aggregate amount in
controversy exceeds $5,000,000.
Smith is far more important for plaintiffs because it allows serial relitigation of class certification. For instance, suppose Rep-1 seeks to
represent Class. The court denies certification, however, because, let’s
say, common questions do not predominate. Smith permits Rep-2 to step
up to represent the same class for the same claim. Because class
certification was denied in Rep-1’s case, no class member is bound by
the unsuccessful effort. In theory, the defendant would have to defeat
any number of serial certification efforts – to face what Professor Redish
calls “death by a thousand cuts.”270
The pro-plaintiff bent of Smith is not the result of developments
under Rule 23. It is born of the day-in-court principle, which is
ultimately rooted in due process. Smith and Knowles are nice
complements to Taylor v. Sturgell,271 in which the Court rejected virtual
representation and described the limited circumstances in which a
nonparty may be precluded by a judgment.272
Smith points out that even states that adopt the Federal Rules are
not required to adopt the Court’s interpretation of Rule 23.273 It is not
clear, for example, that state courts will follow Wal-Mart in applying the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) or the federal view on
269. Id.
270. Martin H. Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a Thousand Cuts: The
Relitigation of Class Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class Action, 99 IOWA L. REV.
1659 (2014). To avoid this pro-plaintiff result, the authors suggest a rule estopping class counsel
from recruiting serial representatives. Professor Clermont has argued that class members should be
estopped from re-litigating class certification by analogy to the “jurisdiction to determine no
jurisdiction” doctrine. Kevin M. Clermont, Class Certification’s Preclusive Effects, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 203, 208 (2011). I have argued that class members can be bound by an adverse ruling on class
certification, so long as the court found the representative in the first case to be adequate. Richard
D. Freer, Preclusion and the Denial of Class Certification: Avoiding the “Death by a Thousand
Cuts,” 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 85 (2014).
271. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
272. Id. at 896.
273. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 n.12 (U.S. 2011).
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procedural front-loading of certification.274 For these and other
reasons,275 class plaintiffs may prefer to litigate in state court. They face
increased obstacles, however, from expansions of federal jurisdiction.
The clearest example, of course, is CAFA, which allows a single
defendant to remove state-court class actions to federal court based upon
minimal diversity of citizenship and an aggregate amount in controversy
of $5,000,000.276 Such powerful magnets make it more difficult for
state-court plaintiffs to stay in state court. As we see now, however, the
Court has given at least some aspects of these grants a limited
interpretation.
V. LIMITED INTERPRETATIONS OF CAFA AND SLUSA
The two remaining cases feature interpretations, respectively, of
CAFA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA).
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. was a parens patriae
action brought by Mississippi against manufacturers of liquid crystal
displays. The suit, filed in state court, alleged violations of state law and
sought restitution on behalf of itself and its citizens.277 The defendants
removed under the “mass action” provision of CAFA.278 This permits
federal jurisdiction based upon minimal diversity not only of class
actions but of suits (brought in states that do not recognize the class
action, such as Mississippi) for monetary relief brought by 100 or more
persons.279 The Court held that Mississippi was the only plaintiff and
rejected the argument that those on whose behalf the state sued should
be considered.280 This interpretation of CAFA permits states or their
officers to sue on behalf of citizens, to avoid the capacious jurisdiction
of CAFA, and remain in state court.281
Chadbourne & Parke282 involved consolidated state-court class

274. For an example of this interpretation, see Jesse Wenger, The Applicability of State Appeal
Bond Caps in Suits Brought in Federal Courts Pursuant to Diversity Jurisdiction, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 979, 993 (2014).
275. For example, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), which permits appellate review of certification
decisions, effective in the federal system since 1998, has not been replicated in all state courts.
Plaintiffs might fear that Rule 23(f) gives a defendant a chance to second-guess class certification
orders that is not available in state courts.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(D)(6) (2012).
277. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 740 (U.S. 2014).
278. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11).
279. Mississippi ex rel. Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 741.
280. Id. at 739.
281. Id. at 744.
282. Chadbourne & Parke LLC v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (U.S. 2014).
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actions that alleged violations of state law through defendants’ Ponzi
scheme in sale of certificates of deposit.283 SLUSA prohibits securities
class actions based upon state law when the alleged misrepresentation or
omission concerns a “covered security.”284 The certificates of deposit at
issue in the case were not “covered,” but the alleged fraud consisted of
misrepresentations that they were backed by covered securities.285 The
Court held that SLUSA applies only when the actual trading is in
covered securities.286 Because the alleged misrepresentation did not
involve such investments, SLUSA did not apply, and the case was
permitted to proceed in state court.287
The holdings in these cases are jurisdictional and will not affect
class practice per se. In each, though, the Court’s narrow interpretations
uphold the plaintiff’s choice of state-court forum.
CONCLUSION
To be sure, there is good news for plaintiffs in this group of thirteen
cases. The continued viability of Federal Rule 23 against state
encroachment was assured in Shady Grove. The Court turned back
attempted inroads on damages class actions for violations of Rule 10b-5
in two ways: first, by retaining the presumption of reliance in fraud on
the market cases in Amgen and, second, by rejecting efforts to require
proof of loss causation and materiality at certification in Halliburton I
and Amgen. In addition, efforts to bind class members in the absence of
certification were rebuffed in Smith and Knowles. Finally, narrow
interpretations of jurisdictional provisions in Mississippi ex rel. Hood
and Chadbourne & Parke ensure a state-court forum for plaintiffs in
certain instances.
Obviously, one should not minimize the importance of the
continued viability of Rule 23. Even so, the plaintiff-side victories are
narrow. They are rooted in substantive securities law and obvious
notions of the day-in-court principle. The defendant-side victories are
more profound because they concern Rule 23 itself, and thus affect
federal class actions generally. Under Wal-Mart, commonality under
Rule 23(a)(2) is a higher hurdle in every federal class action.288 The
focus is undeniably less on raising common questions than on generating
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 1062.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2012).
Chadbourne & Parke, 134 S. Ct. at 1062.
Id. at 1071-72.
Id. at 1062.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (U.S. 2011).
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answers on a class-wide basis. Moreover, money (whether labeled
damages or equitable) can be recovered in a Rule 23(b)(2) class only in
the Allison-type case in which it flows automatically from the
injunctive/declaratory relief and is essentially liquidated. The “equitable
relief” and “predominance” arguments for justifying recovery of money
in a Rule 23(b)(2) class are no longer viable. Beyond this, the Court has
expanded the scope of litigation to be undertaken at the certification
stage. Rule 23 does not set forth a pleading standard.289 The
representative must offer “convincing proof” that the requirements are
satisfied. This will focus, inter alia, on whether merits issues (such as
injury and damages) can be proved at trial en masse. Whether they can
be shown en masse will usually entail a battle of experts, and Wal-Mart
strongly suggests that expert evidence considered at certification must
pass muster under Daubert. This, of course, increases the cost of
certification litigation. And it is now clear that courts must not limit
litigation of certification issues merely because they overlap with
determinations on the merits.290 Moreover, the court must permit the
defendant to present evidence rebutting plaintiffs’ claims for
certification and, in Rule 10-5 cases, rebutting application of the fraudon-the-market theory.291
The most profound development, however, comes from
Concepcion and Italian Colors. Concepcion emphatically restates that
arbitration is a matter of contract, including the adhesion contract.292
State law mandating class arbitration in the face of a contract to the
contrary is preempted. Combining such provisions with class “waivers”
creates the perfect storm for plaintiff classes, at least when the expense
of litigation outweighs the expected individual recovery. The present
state in this regard is the result of the Court’s broad application of the
FAA and not of class action jurisprudence. In the clash between
enforcing contracts as written and ensuring private enforcement of the
law, the Court has sided with the former. As a result, for many disputes,
the question will not be whether the prerequisites of class certification
can be satisfied. It will be whether Rule 23 has any role to play at all.

289.
290.
291.
292.
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